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NOTES

THE EXPRESS DEFENSES OF THE N.Y. CONVENTION ON
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
The legal system intervenes in the arbitral process on two occasions.' The first arises when a party to an arbitration agreement is antagonistic to arbitral dispute resolution. The second arises when the
arbitration has culminated in an award against a party who is adverse
to compliance with it. This second situation is the focus of this note,
with exclusive treatment given to awards subject to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards 2 (N.Y. Convention).
Under the N.Y. Convention, transnational arbitral awards3 need
not be reduced to judgment in the state in which they are rendered
before enforcement is attempted in the United States.4 When a judgment is obtained, however, a party may seek to enforce the judgment
or the award.' Therefore, a brief review of the law governing the enforcement of foreign judgments is in order. Thereafter, this note will
deal with the defenses to enforcement of a foreign arbitral award not
sought to be enforced as a judgment.'
1. See 2 G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS § 13.01, at 1 (rev. ed. 1982).
2. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (effective
for the United States December 29, 1970) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Convention]. The
legislation implementing the N.Y. Convention in the United States is codified at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-208 (1982).
3. Respected commentators in the field distinguish among domestic, foreign, international and delocalized awards. Representative discussions are found in Park & Paulsson,
The Binding Force of InternationalArbitral Awards, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 253 (1983), and 2
G. DELAUME, supra note 1, § 13.02, at 7-11.
4. Discussion with Carolyn Penna, Associate General Counsel, American Arbitration
Association, November 8, 1984. One of the primary objectives of the N.Y Convention is
to eliminate the necessity of reducing a foreign arbitral award to a foreign judgment in

the rendering state. See G.W.

HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCE-

39-44 (1958).
5. Cf. Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir.
1973) (holding that the N.Y. Convention does not preempt New York law on the enforcement of foreign judgments).
6. For a concise review of the law governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, see Bishop & Burnette, United States PracticeConcerning the RecogniMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS

tion of Foreign Judgments, 16

INT'L LAW.

425 (1982).
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FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

Nothing in the United States Constitution requires individual
states or the United States to recognize foreign judgments. The full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution 7 accords judgments rendered in state A, for example, the same status in any other state, for
recognition and enforcement purposes, as it would receive in state A. s
The full faith and credit clause, however, does not-apply to judgments
rendered in foreign nations.9
In spite of this, courts have accorded a great deal of conclusiveness
to foreign judgments in proceedings for recognition and enforcement."
The basis of this treatment is comity. The most authoritative definition of comity, still cited today," is the one found in the 1894 Supreme
Court decision in Hilton v. Guyot.'2 Under the Hilton formulation, the
7. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
8. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
9. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 225 U.S. 185, 190 (1912). See also RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONFLiCT OF Lxws § 98, comment b (1971); but see Scott v. Scott, 331 P.2d
641, 643 (Cal. 1958).
10. For commentary distinguishing between recognition and enforcement, see von
Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Money Judgments in the United States, 6 L. POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37 (1974) and Zaphiriou, Transnational Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 734
(1978).
11. See, e.g., Her Majesty, Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597
F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979); John Sanderson & Co. v. Ludlow Jute Co., 569 F.2d 696 (1st
Cir. 1978).
12. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). The definition referred to in the text follows:
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a foreign country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged by a court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and
the foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and
proofs, and opportunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of the truth of the
matter adjudged; and it should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the
foreign court, unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment,
as by showing that it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that, by the principles of international law, and by the comity of our own country, it should not be
given full credit and effect.
Id. at 205-06.
At least one commentator has stated that the Hilton case replaced the principle of
comity with that of reciprocity. See Wei Ja Ju, The "Enforcement Clause": A New Definition in the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 31 AM. J. CoMp. L.
520 (1983). The analysis is built on that part of the holding which denies conclusive
effect, but allows prima facie evidentary effect, to a judgment of a French court where
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following characteristics of a foreign judgment must be shown to establish a prima facie case for its recognition and enforcement: 3 a formal
judgment; subject matter jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction; timely and
proper notice; opportunity to defend; and proceedings that are held
"according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence." 4 Defenses explicitly set out by the Hilton Court include prejudice and fraud,1 5 and
"that, by the principles of international law, and by the comity of our
16
own country, it [the foreign judgmentl should not be given effect."
The specifically applicable law regarding the recognition of foreign
judgments, however, can only be determined by reference to state rules
on point. This is because the Supreme Court has not yet required the
law in this area to be governed by a federal common law.17 As such,
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins'8 interdicts the power of the federal judici9
ary to formulate standards for the recognition of foreign judgments.
that country's courts do not give conclusive effect to United States judgments. The distinction, for present purposes, does not alter the discussion herein.
13. Bishop & Burnette, supra note 6, at 431-32.
14. 159 U.S. at 205.
15. It must be noted that the type of fraud cognizable as sufficient grounds for nonenforcement must be extrinsic to the transaction and proceedings. Only "fraud that deprives a party of an opportunity to present adequately his claim or defense will suffice."
Bishop & Burnette, supra note 6, at 434 (citing Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, 33 F.2d
667, 671 (1st Cir. 1929)). Allegations that the foreign decree was procured by false statements have been held not to be of that kind. See, e.g., McKay v. Alexander, 268 F.2d 35
(9th Cir. 1959).
16. 159 U.S. at 206.
17. It could do so by reasoning that foreign judgments are acts of a foreign sovereign
which should, as a matter of federal law, not be questioned in United States courts, i.e.,
under the rubric of the Act of State doctrine. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
316 U.S. 398 (1964) (finding that acts of Cuba could not be questioned in United States
courts as a matter of federal law because of the Act of State's "constitutional underpinnings"); cf. also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (broadly construing federal preeminence in the area of foreign affairs). It should be noted, however, that the Ninth
Circuit has held that acts of a foreign judiciary do not fall under the Act of State doctrine. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th Cir. 1976).
The executive has attempted to make the area a matter of federal law by the conclusion of a treaty on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of foreign civil judgments
with the United Kingdom. See Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters, October 26, 1976, reprintedin 16 I.L.M. 71 (1977).
If ratified, interpretation of the treaty would, of course, be a matter of federal law. The
document has not, however, been ratified. See Bishop & Burnette, supra note 6, at 427.
18. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
19. Soon after Erie, the late Professor Philip C. Jessup commented on the dangers of
allowing that decision to affect areas of international law. See Jessup, The Doctrine of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939).
These dangers have not abated; it is aiways possible that the Supreme Court will not
continue to extend Erie so as to circumscribe the power of the federal courts to fashion
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The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962
(Recognition Act) 20 is fairly representative of state law. 2, Under the
Recognition Act, a prima facie case for enforcement is made out when
a party demonstrates that it has been awarded a judgment, "final and
conclusive and enforceable where rendered, even though an appeal
therefrom is pending, or it is subject to an appeal. ' '22 A judgment is not
conclusive, however, if the foreign court lacked personal s or subject
matter jurisdiction, 24 or if "the judgment was rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with the requirements of due process of law."'2 5
The defenses explicitly provided for in the Recognition Act include lack of timely notice, fraud, the repugnancy of the underlying
cause of action to the public policy of the state, a conflict with another
judgment, an agreement by the parties to resolve the dispute otherwise
26
than by adjudication, or that the forum was "seriously inconvenient.

II.

ARBITRAL AWARDS

In stark contrast to the many elements of a prima facie case for
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, and the many de27
fenses available to one opposing such recognition and enforcement,
are the relatively few elements of a prima facie case for enforcement of
a foreign arbitral award and the few grounds for refusal to enforce
them. Most of the latter are concerned with due process inquiries, and
where procedural fairness is shown courts are reluctant, with few exceptions, to look into the merits of a dispute.
It is perhaps ironic that a court will accord more deference to
federal common law governing the enforcement of foreign judgments.
20. 13 U.L.A. 269 (1975). Another act, THE UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT OF 1964 (Enforcement Act), 13 U.L.A. 171 (1975), adopted by 26 states as of
1984, see 1984 U.L.A. Directory and Tables, applies only to "any judgment, decree, or
order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith
and credit in (the adopting) state." Enforcement Act § 1(a). Thus, transnational awards
are excluded. Enforcement of a foreign judgment domestically, however, is a mere matter
of mechanics, once the judgment is judicially recognized.
21. The Recognition Act has been ratified by 12 states. See 1984 U.L.A. Directory
and Tables.

22.

UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS

RECOGNITION ACT OF

1962 § 2, 13 U.L.A.

269 (1975).
23. Id. § 4(a)(2). Section 5 codifies six bases for personal jurisdiction, but allows for
states to recognize others. Id. § 5.
24. Id. § 4(a)(3).
25. Id. § 4(a)(1).
26. Id. § 4(b).
27. See supra notes 13-16, 22-26.
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awards rendered by arbitrators than to decisions rendered by trial
judges, especially with regard to errors of law, when the former are
almost certainly less well versed in the law than the latter. Sense can
be made of this when it is observed that there is a great public interest
in maintaining confidence that the judiciary will correctly apply the
law as it is known. When parties forego the opportunity to utilize this
institution, however, the public interest in ensuring dispute resolution
according to reliable rules gives way to the public and private interests
in expeditious resolution of commercial disputes, and in having trade
practices, known intimately to the decisionmakers, take precedence
28
over formal rules of law.

III.
A.

THE

N.Y.

CONVENTION

Scope of the N.Y Convention

The N.Y. Convention applies to "arbitral awards made in the territory of a state other than the state where recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought,"2 and for those countries which do
not elect a reservation excluding them,"0 to those awards "not considered as domestic awards in the State where the recognition and enforcement are sought."3 1 The latter category may include an award
rendered in the enforcing state, but involving foreign parties, if such an
award is not considered domestic (because of the nationality of the
parties) in the enforcing state.3" The United States has opted for the
28. It has been noted, however, that current international commercial arbitration
practice often fails to avail itself of the potential advantage of using the most qualified
arbitrations in a particular field. See Smit, The Future of InternationalCommercial
Arbitration, WEST'S INT'L L. BULL., Fall 1984, at 5.
29. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. I(1).
30. See id. art. 1(3).
31. See id. art. I(1).
32. There are several situations in which an award may be made in the territory of a
state in which recognition is being sought, yet still not be "domestic." Some nations
characterize the award as international, vel non, on the basis of materially connecting
factors including the situs of the arbitration and the nationality of the parties. Other
legal systems, seen as "progressive" by at least one respected commentator, see 2 G.
DELAUME, supra note 1, § 13.02 at 7, supplement the geographical tests with "qualitative
tests, intended to take into account party autonomy and the needs of international commerce." Id. Some, e.g., Germany, France and Greece, look to the procedural rules applied
in the arbitration to determine its international character. Id. at 8. In Germany, therefore, a domestic award may be international if the arbitration was conducted pursuant to
United States procedural rules. In France, however, an additional factor has recently
been included, viz., whether the award "implicates international commercial interests."
Code de proc6dure civile, art. 1492, reprinted in 3 G. DELAXMB, supra note 1, app. 2, bk.
A, at 130 (rev. ed. 1984). Thus, in France, much discretion is left to the courts.
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aforementioned reservation,3 3 and for another reservation which limits
the applicability of the N.Y. Convention to those awards or arbitrations arising out of legal relationships commercial in nature.3"
B. Recognition of the Agreement
Article II of the N.Y. Convention, which provides for the recognition of the arbitral agreement, was inserted into the Treaty almost as
an afterthought.3 5 Its presence was demanded by the British delegation
to the Convention, who were concerned that a pact which provided for
the enforcement of arbitral awards but did not ensure the binding nature of agreements to arbitrate would be easily circumvented.3 6 The
requirements of a valid arbitration agreement are that it be in writing
and that the subject matter be "capable of settlement by arbitration. '37 A court, when faced with such an agreement, must "refer the
The fact that only 29 of the 50 N.Y. Convention parties have made the same reservation on this issue as the United States, see 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West Supp. 1983) (reservations following the Convention), and treat as international only those awards rendered
on foreign soil, reveals that, at present, the issue of the international character of the
awards is no longer of uniquely academic interest. Commentators in the field are calling
for states to look at the advantages of the "delocalized" or "floating" award. Such an
award would not be governed by the law of any nation, but only by the rules the parties
stipulate to. See Park & Paulsson, supra note 3, at 254-66. Coverage for delocalized
awards was discussed as a possibility for the N.Y. Convention, but was ultimately rejected as "too revolutionary a concept." See Quigley, Accession by the United States to
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1066-67 (1961).
33. See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982) (excluding all awards resulting from arbitrations entirely between citizens of the United States). Chapter 2 of title 9, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.
(1982), is a codification of the N.Y. Convention. Because the treaty is not self-executing,
codification was seen as necessary to fulfill the reciprocity obligation of the Convention,
which states: "A Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present
Convention against other Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself bound
to apply the Convention." N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. XIV. For a discussion of
the reciprocity provision as applied, see infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
34. See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). The arbitral awards to which the N.Y. Convention
applies are not only those which are rendered by arbitrators appointed by the parties,
but include "those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have submitted." N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(2). These include the American Arbitration
Association, the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, the
International Arbitration Association, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, the London Court of Arbitration and the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. These most prominent of the international arbitration organizations are comparatively analyzed in 2 J.G. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS-PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 234-46 (1979).
35. See Quigley, supra note 32, at 1062-64.
36. Id. at 1063.
37. N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. II(1).
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parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.""8
C. Enforcement of Awards
The operative provision of the N.Y. Convention is article III. It
provides that:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure
of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be
imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees
or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards
to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards. 9
Article IV adds that the authenticated original award, or a certified copy thereof, and the original agreement to arbitrate or a certified
copy thereof (and certified translations of these documents, if needed),
must be supplied to obtain enforcement.4 It is significant that no
other document need be supplied.41
D.

Defenses

The remainder of this note addresses the article V defenses to enforcement available to a party against whom an award has been rendered. There are seven defenses, five of which the defendant must
raise, "'2 and two the court may raise sua sponte. a Although there have
been intimations that there are other defenses not specifically mentioned in the N.Y. Convention," this note does not extensively address
them.
38. Id. art. 11(3).
39. Id. art. III.
40. Id. art. IV.
41. When these documents are supplied, the burden of proof shifts, and a prima facie case is established. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Socit6 G~nerale De
L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); Quigley, supra note 32, at
1066. The shifting of the burden of proof on those issues now characterized as defenses
under the N.Y. Convention was perhaps the preeminent improvement of the Convention
over prior law. See 2 G. DELAUME, supra note 1, § 13.20, at 126.
42. N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1).
43. Id. art. V(2).
44. In Fotochrome v. Copal, 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975), it was decided that nonretroactivity of the N.Y. Convention was not a defense where suit was brought after the
Convention entered into force, despite the fact that the contract underlying the dispute
was formed prior to the effective date of the Convention.

N.Y.L. SCH. J.
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Incapacity of the Parties or Invalidity of the Agreement

Ironically, no arbitral award has been vacated in a reported United
States judicial decision because of either lack of capacity of one or both
of the contracting parties or invalidity of the agreement to arbitrate
under the applicable law.4 This may be explained, at least in part, by
the fact that the potential for use (and abuse) of the validity defense in
cases involving domestic agreements to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act 46 has been drastically cut back by the Supreme Court
decision in PrimaPaint Co. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.47 In that case, the
Court held that the validity of the contract was itself a matter for the
arbitrator to decide. 48 The judiciary's decision regarding arbitrability
should be reached by examination of the arbitration clause only, and
not the entire contract. 49 It is hard to imagine a case, however, in
which one would have proof of the invalidity of the clause itself without proof of the invalidity of the entire contract.50 Moreover, since inA defense of "manifest disregard of the law" under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
§§ 1-14 (1982), was implied in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953). This,
taken together with the fact that the residual application provision of 9 U.S.C. § 208
(1982) incorporates into the N.Y. Convention's implementing statute the Federal Arbitration Act, insofar as the two are not inconsistent, can lead to an argument that the
Convention's defenses contain one for "manifest disregard of the law."
The Second Circuit, however, while declining to decide the question, did state that
"[b]oth the legislative history of Article V ... and the statute enacted to implement the
United States' accession to the Convention are strong authority for treating as exclusive
the bases set forth in the Convention for vacating an award." Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Soci6tk G6nerale De L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d
Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
45. The N.Y. Convention provides:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the
law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereof, under the law of the country where the award was made ....
N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1)(a).
46. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
47. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
48. Id. at 403-04.
49. Id.
50. In the wake of Prima Paint, the courts have consistently upheld the validity of
arbitration agreements. The courts have rejected the following arguments favoring the
invalidity of arbitration agreements: the cause of action arose prior to the agreement to
arbitrate and therefore could not have been covered by it, Coenen v. R.W. Presspich &

U.S.C.
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capacity of the parties would seem to bring into question the validity
of the entire contract, pursuit of this defense was impliedly discouraged in Prima Paint.
The article V(1)(a) defense distinguishes between the law under
which a court should examine the capacity of the parties ("the law applicable to them") and the law under which a court should examine the
validity of the agreement ("the law to which the parties have subjected
Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972); non-compliance with conditions precedent in the contract precludes utilizing an arbitration agreement, see Carey
v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1963); the contract expressly provides for various types of judicial relief, see Erving v. Virginia Squires
Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972); the claims being pressed to arbitration are
frivolous, see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 501 F.2d 423 (8th
Cir. 1974), see also Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); arbitration is not a viable alternative if the statute of limitations has
run on the claim, see Condill, Rowlett, Scott v. Bd. of Educ., 47 A.D.2d 610, 364
N.Y.S.2d 7 (1975); a contrary stipulation prior to the invocation of the arbitration clause
negates the arbitration clause, see Boston & Maine Corp. v. Illinois R.R., 396 F.2d 425
(2d Cir. 1968); there exists an implied waiver regarding arbitration, see Germany v. River
Terminal Ry., 477 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1973) (no waiver by defending on the merits), but
see Lounge-A-Round v. G.C.M. Mills, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 2d 190, 166 Cal. Rptr. 920
(1980) (litigation for nine months without raising arbitration defense constitutes waiver);
the party seeking arbitration has already defaulted in the arbitration, see Mason v.
Stevensville Golf & Country Club, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stay of litigation will be granted even where party seeking it is in default in arbitration); arbitration
of certain statutory claims violates the law from which the claim arose, see, e.g., Hart v.
Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1971) (where none of the three involved states
had provisions for settlement of an insurance dispute, resolution via the United States
Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act) is not a violation of the McCarran Act).
The defenses that the courts will acknowledge, post Prima Paint, include claims
that the contract did not involve interstate commerce, see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.
of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (but note this defense is only good under the Arbitration
Act, and not under state law, which may be more favorable to arbitration); the specific
agreement for arbitration was procured by fraud, see Main v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 3d 19, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1978); there was never an
arbitration agreement embodied in a written contract, see C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int'l
Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977) (contract created under U.C.C. § 2-207(3) by performance); arbitration of certain disputes would be violative of public policy, see Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1958) (violation of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 not
arbitrable); N.V. Maatschippij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d
874 (2d Cir. 1976) (patent validity challenges not arbitrable); American Safety Equip.
Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (antitrust claim not arbitrable).
In addition, it appears that mutual mistake is still accepted as a valid ground for negating an arbitration clause. See County of Middlesex v. Gevyn Constr. Corp., 450 F.2d 53
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1971) (dicta). It is questionable, however, whether
Prima Paint reverses prior decisions which held that frustration nullifies an arbitration
clause. See Eastern Marine Corp. v. Fukaya Trading Co. S.A., 364 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966). Cf. N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. L1(3), (to be
enforceable, an agreement must be capable of being performed).
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[the agreement] or, failing any indication .. . , under the law of the
country where the award was made").' In the former situation, a court
52
may apply its conflict of laws rules to determine the applicable law.
In the latter case, the parties are bound by the law they have selected
(either expressly, or "by default").5 3 Why the N.Y. Convention makes
this distinction is not readily apparent. It may be surmised that the
capacity of the parties was viewed as a matter more closely related to
fundamental fairness of enforcement, and thus, not a matter to be regulated by rules chosen by the parties.
2.

Lack of Notice or Inability to Present a Case

Article V(1)(b) provides that if a party is not given notice of either
the appointment of the arbitrator or the proceeding, or if he is otherwise unable to present his case, he will not be held answerable for an
arbitral award rendered against him. 5 Although the clause contains no
criteria upon which to gauge the adequacy of the notice, at least one
court has implied that the forum state should apply its own law of
adequate notice.5 5 It should be noted, however, that there is a remote
chance that a court may analogize to the previous clause of the N.Y.
Convention which states that the question of validity of the agreement
is to be determined under the law the parties have selected, or, failing
any selection, under the law of the situs of the arbitration.5
51. N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1)(a).
52. Cf. Matter of Ferrara, 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (United States law rather
than Italian law governed the court's construction of underlying contract containing arbitration clause).
53. For a case in which the failure to select a specific law may have worked to the
prejudice of the party which prevailed at the arbitration, see Fertilizer Corp. of India v.
IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Oh. 1981).
54. The N.Y. Convention, art. V(1)(b) provides that enforcement may be denied if:
"(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable
to present his case ...." N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1)(b).
It is probable that this defense would be read into the N.Y. Convention, even if it
were not expressly stated, as it embodies notions of due process which are, in the words
of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), fundamental to the jurisprudence of civilized
nations. Cf. id. at 205-06.
55. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci6t6 G6nerale De L'Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
56. N.Y. Convention, supra nbte 2, art. V(1)(a). The paucity of cases in which the
notice defense has been argued is a tribute to the efficacy of arbitration institutions in
which is reposed the obligation not to violate the provision. See, e.g., § 7 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), effective October
1, 1977, reprinted in 5 J.G. WETTER, supra note 34, at 65; article 3 of the Arbitration
Rules for the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
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The inability to present a case defense was litigated in Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci&t6 Ginerale De LIndustrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 57 a leading N.Y. Convention decision. In that case
the appellant claimed that this defense could be made out by a showing that the arbitrator denied an application to postpone an arbitral
session, which application was made because a witness of the appellant's had a prior engagement on the day the arbitral session took
place."8 The Second Circuit took note of several factors in its rejection
of this argument. First, the witness had submitted to the arbitrators an
affidavit concededly containing most of the information to which he
would have testified (the rest of which was available upon the appellant's request); second, the nonappearance was solely due to a commitment to lecture; and third, the arbitrators have a strong interest in
adhering to a schedule set on the basis of convenience "to parties,
counsel and arbitrators scattered about the globe." 59 On the facts, the
court held that this was not a case that would constitute a denial of
United States due process.6 0 The court stated that when a party agrees
to arbitrate, it may be agreeing to forego some of the advantages of
litigation, such as compulsory process."
The defense was also litigated before a district court in Biotronik
Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH. & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co.,6 2 a case presenting a novel use of the phrase "unable to present its case." There, the party opposing enforcement argued that because legal rights under an agreement between the parties were not yet
fully determinable, s its adversary's commencement of arbitration was
premature, and the party opposing enforcement was therefore unable
to present its case.6 4 The court simply stated that this fact could have
been made known to the arbitrators, and since it was not, the party's
due process rights, violation of which is the essence of the article
V(1)(b) defense, were not violated. 5 Had this fact been presented to
the arbitrators but not taken into account, it is unclear what the result
effective June 1, 1975, reprinted in id. at 89-90.
57. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). For a more thorough discussion of the facts of this
case, see infra text accompanying notes 131-37.
58. Id. at 975.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 975-76.
61. Id. at 975.
62. 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976).
63. Medford conceded liability under the agreement that was the subject of arbitration, but alleged that it had a right to offset this liability by commissions that it earned
under a separate agreement. Id. at 135-36.
64. Id. at 140.
65. Id. at 140-41.
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would have been. In view of the deference given arbitral awards, the
tenuous nature of the claim, and the reluctance of courts to review contract interpretations of arbitrators,"6 it may be assumed that this
would not be a bar to enforcement.
3.

Award Outside the Scope of the Submission

Article V(1)(c) provides that an award rendered on a dispute not
within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate may be refused recognition and enforcement.6 7 The portions of the award dealing with differences within the scope of the submission, however, may be recognized
and enforced if they are severable.6 This provision can be viewed as
merely reiterating article V(1)(a), which provides that a party will be
bound by an award only to the extent it covers issues he has agreed
should be arbitrated. 9
Several cases have discussed this defense, including Parsons &
Whittemore," in which the Second Circuit stated that the provision
parallels section 10(d) of the Federal Arbitration Act,7 1 and cited cases
decided under the Act in its application of the N.Y. Convention provision. 7' The court construed the defense narrowly to create a presumption that the arbitration board acted within its powers.7 3 Indeed, in
that case, the court found that an award for loss of production, in the
face of a contract provision that "neither party shall have liability for
loss of production," was not outside the scope of the submission.7 ' The
court reasoned that so long as it could reasonably believe that the arbitral board had not ignored the contract term, it was not necessary for
the court and the arbitrators to agree on a contract interpretation. 5 To
66. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77.
67. The N.Y. Convention, art. V(1)(c) provides that recognition and enforcement
may be denied if:
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so
submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted
to arbitration may be recognized and enforced . ...
N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1)(c).
68. Id.
69. Quigley, supra note 32, at 1068.
70. 508 F.2d at 969.
71. 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1982).
72. 508 F.2d at 976.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 976-77.
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hold otherwise, the court said, would be to gain from the court a reconstruction of the contract, a result wholly inconsistent with the policy of
according deference to the arbitrator.76
A similar situation arose in Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc.,77 where the arbitrators awarded consequential damages
even though the parties' contract excluded such liability. 78 After Parsons & Whittemore, the district court in IDI, even if so inclined, would
have had difficulty vacating the award. This is because the opinion of
the arbitral panel in IDI, a "speaking award" in which the arbitrator's
reasoning is stated, made specific reference to the liability exclusion in
the contract, thus establishing beyond cavil that the panel was not ignoring the provision.7 9 Here, as in Parsons & Whittemore, the court
found no action outside the scope of the arbitrator's authority.
The court did, however, evaluate an argument that the legal theory upon which the arbitrators based their award was a pet theory of
Lord Devlin's, the author of the award." The argument should have
been doomed at inception under a close reading of Parsons & Whittemore, which states that the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract
need not coincide with the court's, as long as the relevant contract provisions were not ignored.8' The IDI court, however, went so far as to
verify that Lord Devlin's theory was indeed a viable one, blessed by
scholarly recognition. 2 The court, then, seemed to inquire into the legal basis upon which the award rested-a rare occurrence
in judicial
83
review of claims for enforcement of arbitral awards.
4.

Arbitral Authority or Procedure Violative of Relevant Rules

Article V(1)(d) states that it
an award if the composition of
used, was not in accordance with
ing such agreement, with the law

shall be a defense to confirmation of
the arbitral body, or the procedure
the agreement of the parties, or, failof the situs of the arbitration. 4 This

76. Id. at 976.
77. 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Oh. 1981).
78. Id. at 950.
79. See id. at 959. The clause regarding consequential damages was held inapplicable
because of the respondent's fundamental breach. Id.
80. Id. at 954.
81. See supra text accompanying note 75.
82. 517 F. Supp. at 959.
83. This unnecessarily opens the door to judicial investigation of the legal theories
upon which an award is based. Such an investigation cannot find justification in any of
the N.Y. Convention's express defenses to enforcement, and whether it should be grafted
on is indeed questionable.
84. The N.Y. Convention, art. V(1)(d) provides that an award may be denied enforcement if:
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section is the product of a compromise between antagonistic negotiating forces.15 One negotiating faction fought for a delocalized arbitration
which need not be tied to the law of any country.86 Another sought to
force the arbitration to be carried on in accord with the law of the
situs.8 7 The result is in full accord with neither position and is capable
of two interpretations.
Because procedure must be in accord merely with the law which
the parties agree to, the argument can be made that it need not be in
accord with any preexisting national rules. This interpretation seems
to follow most logically from the language of the provision and is more
consistent with the reforms advocated by scholars in the field. 8 Conversely, the provision can be construed as being restricted to the law of
a particular country." It appears that United States courts might be
justified in asserting the latter interpretation, insofar as the parties
agree to procedure which does not accord with basic due process no(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took
place ....
N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1)(d).
85. Quigley, supra note 32, at 1068-69. One group argued for "complete subjection of
the arbitral procedure to the law of the country where the award was made," the other
advocated "contractual freedom to designate an arbitral procedure independent of the
law of any country." Id. at 1068.
86. On delocalized arbitration, see Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached
from the Law of its Country of Origin, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 358 (1981).
87. The United States led this faction. See G.W. HAIGHT, supra note 4, at 56-59. This
is not surprising because the deference accorded the arbitral award in the United States,
although not as great in the late 1950's as now, was great enough to encourage businessmen to conduct their arbitrations here. Thus, the United States faction wanted to have
United States law govern most of the commercial arbitrations in the world.
The United States judicial posture stood in gross contradistinction to the English
procedure of the time, whereby either of the parties could compel the arbitrator to "state
the case." Under this practice, the parties could force judicial resolution of any issue that
was even colorably legal (as opposed to factual). The loss of the use of award funds that
resulted from the interminable court delays prompted legislation from Whitehall that
precluded the stated case procedure, allowing instead for limited appeal by consent of all
parties or leave of the court. Arbitration Act, 1979 ch. 1, reprinted in 49 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND (3d ed. 1980). On this Act, see literature annotated at 2 G. DELAUME, supra note 1, § 13.16 n.15. The House of Lords emphasized in no uncertain terms
just how limited the right to review had become in Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. B.T.P. Tioxide (The Nema), [1981] 3 W.L.R. 92, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1099 (1981).
88. See, e.g., 2 G. DELAUME, supra note 1, § 13.13, at 88. Some scholars see in the
offing a new international merchant law, see, e.g., Cremades, The Impact of International Arbitration on the Development of Business Law, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 526 (1983).
89. The distinction between localized and delocalized arbitration procedures is
pointed out in Quigley, supra note 32, at 1068-69.
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tions.90 It should be noted that the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses of 192391 is more restrictive, and expressly states that the proceedings shall be governed by the law of its situs.2 However, this protocol, by virtue of article VII of the N.Y. Convention, 93 is the governing
law only for those parties to the protocol which have not ratified the
94
N.Y. Convention.
The question of the improper composition of the arbitral tribunal
has at least once been litigated as falling under article V(1)(d).f1 In
Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch-FosterCorp.,96 the defense
was based on an allegation that the president of the arbitration panel
90. The United States delegate to the drafting conference stated in 1958, that
"United States adherence to the convention would be misleading" insofar as this provision is concerned, because "courts have tended to regard party choice of law as contrary
to public policy, at least with respect to some subject matter." Quigley, supra note 32, at
1069 n.85 (quoting Official Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations
Conference on International Commercial Arbitration 20 (Aug. 15, 1958)). Cf. Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci~tk G~nerale De L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508
F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974), where the court stated that "[e]nforcement of foreign arbitral
awards may be denied on . . . [public policy grounds] only where enforcement would
violate the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice." Id. at 974.
91. 27 L.N.T.S. 157, reprintedin 3 G. DELAUME, supra note 1, app. 2, bk. A, at 5 (rev.
ed. 1984).
92. 3 G. DELAUME, supra note 1, app. 2, bk. A, at 5 (rev. ed. 1984). Similarly, article
5(1)(d) of the Inter-American Convention of 1975, reprintedin 14 I.L.M. 336, forbids the
use of the procedures of a transnational arbitration organization, such as the International Arbitration Association.
93. The N.Y. Convention, art. VII(2) provides:
(2) The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 [27 L.N.T.S.
157; 92 L.N.T.S. 301] shall cease to have effect between Contracting States on
their becoming bound and to the extent that they become bound, by this
Convention.
N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. VII(2).
94. The European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, April 21,
1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364, reprinted in 3 G. DELAUME, supra note 1, app. 2, bk. A, at 37
(rev. ed. 1984) (European Convention) and bilateral treaties on point can also muddy the
waters. For example, the European Convention provides procedures for the appointment
of arbitrators, but the only three EEC states to ratify the Convention, Italy, Germany
and France, entered into a subsequent agreement which entrusts matters regarding the
composition of arbitral tribunals to the courts having jurisdiction, and thus moots the
effect of the European Convention. 2 G. DELAUME, supra note 1, § 13.11, at 75.
95. See Imperial Ethiopian Gov't. v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1976).
96. Id. Although the issue was nominatively cast in terms of article V(1)(d), the case
is more instructive on the interplay between the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the N.Y. Convention. See id. at 336-37. The court declined to so
cast the issue. See id. at 337. It is the opinion of this writer, however, that the value of
the case is revealed under such an analysis.
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had a material connection with the Ethiopian Government, a party to
the arbitration.97 The district court confirmed the award in spite of an
allegation that the losing party should have been able to obtain discovery in the court action regarding the connection between the arbitrator
and the adverse party.98 The court reasoned that any objection to the
composition of the panel had been waived. 9
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but declined to adopt the district
court's waiver theory.100 It determined that the evidence was sufficient
for the district court to find that the movant lacked good faith in its
effort to obtain discovery.1 ' The court also found that it was within
the district court's power to deny the discovery motion.' 2
5.

Nonbinding or Overturned Award

The defense set out in article V(1)(e) states that there shall be a
defense to the award if it "has not yet become binding on the parties,
or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made."' 0 3
The provision was a response to concerns that the award should
not be given binding effect in one country when it is not binding in the
eyes of the law under which it was made.'0 The countervailing consideration was the desirability of avoiding the "double exequatur," which
requires judicial recognition (i.e. confirmation) of the award in both the
rendering state and in the state in which enforcement is sought.' 5
The defense was litigated in Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc,'0° where it was alleged that because Indian courts review
speaking awards for errors of law,'0 7 and since the speaking award at
97. Id. at 335. It was conceded that the president of the arbitration panel was a member of the committee that drafted the civil code for Ethiopia. Id.
99. Id.
99. Id. The objection to the composition of the arbitral panel was raised by Baruch
more than six months after it was notified of the award. Id. at 336.
100. See id. at 335.
101. Id. at 337.
102. Id.
103. The N.Y. Convention, art. V(1)(e) provides that it shall be a defense to enforcement if:
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under
the law of which, that award was made.
N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1)(e).
104. See Quigley, supra note 32, at 1069.
105. Id. at 1069.
106. 5 1 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Oh. 1961).
107. The award was being reviewed by an Indian court to determine whether the
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issue was under review by the Indian courts, it could in no sense be
considered final, and should not be given binding effect.' 08 The United
States court, however, interpreted both the contract and the relevant
Indian law as indications that an award should be binding when rendered. ' Ultimately, the court relied on a statement in a law review
article by the General Counsel of the American Arbitration Association" 0 to find that the award was enforceable."' The critical language
quoted by the court is: "The award will be considered 'binding' for the
purposes of the Convention if no further recourse may be had to another arbitral tribunal (that is, an appeals tribunal). The fact that recourse may be had to a court of law does not prevent the award from
being 'binding'."'1
Fertilizer's finding regarding the "binding" effect of an award
must be viewed in the light of article VI. 1 3 That provision was drafted
to improve upon the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign
Arbitral Awards of 1927,'1 4 which provides that an award would not be
considered binding if an appeal was pending in the rendering country." 5 Article V provides that a pending appeal only allows, and does
not compel, the court to adjourn its decision, whereas article VI allows
the court in the enforcing country to require suitable security from the
party opposing enforcement of the award as a condition to such
enforcement." 6
In applying article VI, the court in Fertilizer acknowledged the
arbitrators could properly award consequential damages when the contract expressly
provided otherwise. Id. at 956. For a more thorough discussion of the facts of this case,
see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
108. 517 F. Supp. at 956.
109. 517 F. Supp. at 956-57.
110. Aksen, American Arbitration Association Arrives in the Age of Aquarius:
United States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1971).
111. 517 F. Supp. at 957-58.
112. Id. at 958 (quoting Aksen, supra note 110, at 11).
113. The N.Y. Convention, art. VI provides:
If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made
to a competent authority referred to in article V(1)(e), the authority before
which the award is sought to be relied on may, if it considers it proper, adjourn
the decision on the enforcement of the award and may also, on the application of
the party claiming enforcement of the award, order the other party to give suitable security.
N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. VI.
114. Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927, 92
L.N.T.S. 301, reprinted in 3 G. DELAUME, supra note 1, app. 2, bk. A, at 11 (rev. ed.
1984).
115. Id. art. I(d).
116. N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. VI.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 5

N.Y. Convention's objective of encouraging the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 1 7 The court also was mindful of the fact
that IDI had been unable to collect on another award rendered against
IDI in India." 8 Nevertheless, to avoid the possibility of inconsistent
results, the court refused to enforce the award until it was considered
final under Indian law."' 9
6.

Arbitrability

The last two express defenses of the N.Y. Convention differ from
the first five in that they may be raised by the court sua sponte."2 ° The
first of these two is article V(2)(a). It provides that the court which is
petitioned for enforcement may deny the request if "[tihe subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
12
This defense may be viewed as
the law of [the enforcing] country.""
otiose in light of the second of these two defenses, 22 which renders
unenforceable those awards contrary to the public policy of the enforcing state. 2 '
The types of cases in which article V(2)(a) will yield a decision
against enforcement are, at present, a subject of speculation.124 Virtually all of the litigation relating to amenability of a claim to arbitral
117. 517 F. Supp. at 961.
118. Id. The other award, known as the Methanol award, was rendered under the
Indian Arbitration Act and an appeal to the Indian courts was pending on it at the time
this case was heard. Id. at 950. IDI conceded that the Indian courts had enforced the
award and required IDI to post security. Id. at 962. The Indian Government, however,
did not allow withdrawal because of foreign exchange regulations. Id. at 950.
119. Id. at 962.
120. The first five express defenses of the N.Y. Convention have also been said to
differ from the last two in that the former deal with allegations that the award is defective while the latter deal with situations in which enforcement "would offend some basic
concepts of the recognizing country." See 2 G. DELAUME, supra note 1, § 13.20, at 126.
121. N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. V(2)(a).
122. See infra text accompanying note 126.
123. French delegates to the N.Y. Convention objected to the inclusion of article
V(2)(a) on the ground that such a review would undermine the independence of the
international award, and the Germans argued that the relevant objections could be handled under the public policy defense of article V(2)(b). See Quigley, supra note 32, at
1070 nn. 88-89 (citing G.W. HAIGHT, supra note 4, at 66).
124. One court has alluded, in dicta, to the possibility of nonenforceability of awards
rendered in antitrust disputes under this section, as well as under the public policy section. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Socitk G~nerale De L'Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974). Also, the practices under state arbitration law may provide guidance.
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settlement has, in the United States, taken place under the public policy defense. 2 '
7. Public Policy
The final express defense of article V has been the most frequently
litigated. Article V(2)(b) provides that recognition and enforcement of
an award may be refused if the "competent authority" in the enforcing
state finds that "[t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would
be contrary to the public policy of that country. 1 2 6 In light of the leeway given the enforcing state by this provision,12 7 interdicted in large
measure only by the reciprocity clause, " 8 it is not surprising that it has
generated more litigation than any other provision.
The Parsons & Whittemore129 case is the leading authority for a
narrow construction of the public policy defense. There, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit construed the public policy defense in
the context of the "pro-enforcement bias" of the N.Y. Convention and
asserted that the reciprocity considerations militated against an expansive reading of the clause. 30
Parsons & Whittemore initiated suit to foreclose RAKTA from
collecting on a letter of credit. 1 ' RAKTA counterclaimed for enforcement of an arbitral award rendered in its favor. 3 2 RAKTA had contracted with Parsons & Whittemore for the latter to construct and
temporarily run a paperboard mill in Egypt.' The Agency for International Development (AID), a branch of the United States Depart125. One authority has stated that when discussing the issue of public policy, "the
issue of arbitrability of the dispute can, for all practical purposes, be merged." 2 G. DELAUME, supra note 1, § 13.20, at 128. One case, however, that does deal with article
V(2)(a) as a distinct defense will be treated infra at notes 143-45 and accompanying text,
with the public policy defense cases.
126. The N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. V(2)(b). It is interesting to note that
the conference excluded the language of the Geneva Convention, that contrariness to the
fundamental principles of law of the enforcing country would likewise be grounds for
nonrecognition. One writer persuasively contends that this step should be interpreted as
a broadening of the definition of public policy included in the N.Y. Convention. See
Quigley, supra note 32, at 1070-71.
127. Quigley states that the provision "has the effect of relegating the ultimate decision on the efficacy of the Convention to the good faith of the Contracting States."
Quigley, supra note 32, at 1070.
128. The reciprocity clause grants states the right to place restrictions on the enforcement of awards rendered in states which have similar enforcement restrictions. N.Y.
Convention, supra note 2, art. XIV. See infra notes 174-85 and accompanying text.
129. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).'
130. Id. at 973-74.
131. Id. at 971.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 972.
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ment of State, had financed RAKTA's role in the contract which contained both force majeure and arbitration clauses. 3 4 On the eve of the
Arab-Israeli Six Day War, many of Parsons & Whittemore's American
work crews quit Egypt, and thereafter, the Egyptian Government expelled all Americans except those who would apply and qualify for a
special visa.' 35 AID subsequently withdrew its financial backing."3 ' The
parties disputed whether the resulting postponement was justified
under the force majeure clause and RAKTA invoked the arbitration
clause. 3 1
Parsons & Whittemore's public policy defense centered on the
withdrawal of financial backing by the executive branch. It argued that
the arbitrators should have found that Parsons & Whittemore had to
remain away from Egypt, a course dictated by the action of the State
Department.'3 8 Parsons & Whittemore contended that the award violated the public policy of the United States by holding wrongful a
party's compliance with the implied, but no less imperative, wishes of
the executive branch. 139 The court had "little hesitation" in dismissing
this argument, pointing out that to confuse a political "national policy"
with the type of "public policy" that the N.Y. Convention contemplates as grounds for nonenforcement of an arbitral award would contravene the "circumscribed public policy doctrine" that was envisioned
by its framers.' 40
Closely aligned with this argument was Parsons & Whittemore's
contention that the subject matter of the dispute was not arbitrable
and that therefore, under article V(2)(a), the resulting award should
not be enforced.' 4 ' The argument was premised on the fact that the
142
dispute had a significant impact on United States foreign policy.
Therefore, it was argued, the dispute could not "be placed at the mercy
of foreign arbitrators 'who are charged with the execution of no public
trust' and whose loyalties are to foreign interests.' 43 The argument
was summarily dismissed by the court, which stated that categories of
cases may be nonarbitrable, but single cases, in which "an issue of national interest may incidentally figure," are not. 44 Moreover, the court
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 974.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 975.
143. Id. at 975 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 23).
144.

Id.
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indicated that even if ad hoc determinations of nonarbitrability were
to be allowed, the national interest of the Parsons & Whittemore claim
would not rise to the level at which nonarbitrability should be
declared. 4"
Another public policy defense, alleging fraud in the proceedings,
was denied in Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH. & Co. v.
Medford Medical Instrument Co. 46 There, Medford, although never
appearing at the arbitration, argued that the failure of the successful
party to enter into evidence any information about
an alleged agree47
ment said to affect the claim constituted fraud.
In rejecting Medford's defense, the court adopted Parsons &
Whittemore's narrow construction of the public policy defense. 4" The
court, however, would likely have held against Medford even under a
broad reading of the defense by reasoning that a party does not commit fraud merely by failing to present its opponent's case. It is, in a
sense, unfortunate that such an uncompelling set of facts confronted
the court in the Biotronik case. A more egregious case of fraud might
have led the court to declare that although fraud under the law of the
enforcing court is not articulated as an express defense to enforcement,
it is a defense cognizable under the rubric of the public policy defense.
As it stands, this question remains unresolved.
Duress has also been recognized as a defense cognizable under the
public policy section. In the case of Transmarine Seaways Corp. of
Monrovia (M.S. Ocean Voyager) v. Marc Rich & Co.,' 4 District Judge
Haight reviewed a complex maritime transaction and stated that if the
agreement which was the subject of the arbitration was obtained by
duress, an award based on that agreement's validity could not be sustained.' 50 Because Marc Rich could not shoulder the heavy burden of
proving duress, however, the court found no violation of United States
public policy. 18
In Transmarine, a second public policy violation was asserted. In
this argument, Marc Rich reiterated an objection it raised at the arbi145. Id. The court reasoned that if Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
found no public policy objections to the arbitrability of United States securities laws in a
transnational dispute, where such laws had already been deemed by the Supreme Court
to be nonarbitrable in the domestic sphere, then, a fortiori, no public policy objection
should be found in the case before it. See id.
146. 415 F. Supp. 133, 137 (D.N.J. 1976).
147. Id. at 137. For a more thorough discussion of the facts of this case, see supra
notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
148. Id. at 139.
149. 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
150. Id. at 358.
151. Id. at 361.
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tration, that the presence of one of the arbitratcrs on the panel was
improper. 52 Rich disclaimed any specific allegations of bias, but did
object to an appearance of bias.153 Rich placed primary reliance for its
position15 4 on the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty.5 5 In that case, the award was vacated because a "supposedly neutral" arbitrator failed to disclose its
financial relationship with one of the parties. 56 In Transmarine the
contention was raised that the arbitrator's company "represented another company, which in turn asserted a claim (entirely unrelated to
those at bar) against Rich." '57 Judge Haight distinguished Commonwealth and other cases cited by Rich, noting that they all involved a
finding of impropriety only after disclosure of financial remuneration
8
flowing from a party to the arbitrator in question.5 The court found
no appearance of bias since the relationship in question was "far too
tenuous . . . to require the disqualification of an experienced and
respected maritime arbitrator, particularly where Rich offers no challenge to [the arbitrator's] personal integrity."' 5 9
In determining the question of "appearance of bias," the Transmarine court applied the same "reasonableness" standard that was articulated in Commonwealth.'s0 In applying the reasonableness standard, the court noted that the maritime arbitration community in New
York was "relatively small, and closely knit,"' 6' and that commercial
62
Alrelationships between arbitrators and parties were inevitable.
though not viewing financial involvement as an absolute prerequisite to
a finding of impropriety, the court was unwilling to allow tenuous rela152. 480 F. Supp. at 357. Although this type of public policy violation has been asserted in other cases, see, e.g., FertilizerCorp. of India, infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text, it might be more appropriately asserted under article V(1)(d). This article
allows a defense where the composition of the arbitral body is not in accord with the
parties agreement or applicable law. See supra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
153. Id. at 356.
154. Id. at 357-58.
155. 393 U.S. 145 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 112 (1969).
156. The arbitrator was paid $12,000 in consulting fees from the successful party. Id.
at 146.
157. 480 F. Supp. at 358.
158. See id. at 357-58. The cases cited by Rich involved "direct financial or professional relationships." Id. at 357.
159. Id. at 358.
160. Id. at 358. The Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatings said: "We cannot
believe that it was the purpose of Congress to authorize litigants to submit their cases
and controversies to arbitration boards that might reasonably be thought biased against
one litigant and favorable to another." 393 U.S. at 150 (emphasis added).
161. 490 F. Supp. at 358.
162. See id.
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tionships to disrupt the arbitration system."' 3 To Judge Haight, therefore, the threshold of the reasonable appearance of bias standard
would seem to be a formidable one.
The composition of a tribunal was also examined under the public
164
policy defense in Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc.
There, the district court again found no impropriety even though an
arbitrator had received remuneration from one of the parties for formerly representing that party in another arbitration.16 5 The court distinguished this case from the facts of Commonwealth and stated that
nondisclosure of the arbitrator's relationship caused insufficient corruption of the proceedings to warrant setting aside an award. 6 6 One
factor contributing to the result was that the panel was in any event
unanimous. 167 Another contributing factor which was used to distinguish this case from Commonwealth was that in Fertilizer the questioned arbitrator was selected by one of the parties to the arbitration,
was selected by
whereas in Commonwealth the questioned arbitrator
68
the arbitrators who were appointed by the parties.1
The foregoing applications of the public policy defense of arbitrator impropriety reveal a judicial willingness to circumscribe its scope.
This interpretation is in accord with the narrow construction of the
public policy defense set out in Parsons & Whittemore.169 Still, parties
163. See id. If all arbitrators were disqualified simply because of an "appearance of
bias," resolution of these types of maritime disputes through arbitration would be undermined. See id. In fact the practice in the United States is for arbitrators to be paid by
the party appointing the arbitrator. See Smit, supra note 28, at 6.
164. 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Oh. 1981).
165. Id. at 953-55. IDI Management had alleged that one of the arbitrators, Mr. B.
Sen, had served as counsel to Fertilizer in at least two other legal or arbitral proceedings
"and that no disclosure was made to IDI." Id. at 953.
166. Id. at 954.
167. Id. at 953.
168. Id. at 955. A common practice in selecting arbitration panels is for each party to
select an arbitrator, and for the arbitrators to select a third, neutral arbitrator. See 2 G.
DELAUME, supra note 1, § 13.11, at 74. It should not be surprising, therefore, if the parties select as their arbitrator one who may be sympathetic to their cause.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30. The narrow construction of the public policy defense was also reaffirmed in Fotochrome v. Copal, 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.
1975).
In Fotochrome, a contract for the purchase of cameras made in Japan was entered
into between Fotochrome, an American corporation, and Copal, a Japanese corporation
without any jurisdictional ties to the United States. The contract contained an arbiration
clause. A dispute arose, and arbitration was commenced in Japan. After 14 sessions over
almost two years, Fotochrome sought and was granted leave to examine two witnesses. It
never produced them.
After four sessions were aborted because of Fotochrome's failure to produce the witnesses, the arbitration panel threatened to terminate the arbitration if they were not
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should encourage arbiters to disclose any relationships that might result in an appearance of bias.
8.

Reciprocity

The N.Y. Convention's article XIV provides that "[a] Contracting
State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present Convention
against other Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself
bound to apply the Convention."' 170 The article may be interpreted as
giving states the right to accord reciprocal treatment by not recognizing certain awards rendered in states which have either made express
reservations to the N.Y. Convention or restrictive interpretations to
the Treaty.'17
In Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 72 the district court construed article XIV so that it would apply to the express
reservations.3'" Thus, courts may de facto adopt in specific cases the
reservations which have been adopted by the state in which the award
sought to be enforced was rendered.1 74 This result was reached despite
arguments to the contrary emanating from the legislative history of the
N.Y. Convention.' 7 5 The court reasoned that although the "nondomestic awards exclusion" reservation has its own independent reciprocity
provision, and the "commercial awards only" reservation has none at
all, article XIV has no restrictive language in it. 76 The court denied
produced at the next scheduled session. Five days before that session, Fotochrome filed a
petition in bankruptcy in the United States, and a day later, the referee issued an order
enjoining, inter alia, the continuance of any arbitration. The tribunal in Japan decided
that the order did not apply to it and rendered an award for Copal.
The award was filed in Japan and became, in effect, a binding judgment there. Copal
filed a proof of claim in the United States bankruptcy proceeding. Fotochrome moved for
a hearing on the merits of the claim in the bankruptcy court. The referee in bankruptcy
granted Fotochrome's motion but District Judge Weinstein reversed, holding that the
bankruptcy order had no extraterritorial effect and did not reach Copal, which had insufficient jurisdictional contacts with the United States.
The Second Circuit affirmed, but avoided reaching the issue of whether reconditioning a bankrupt is the kind of public policy which falls within the scope of article V(2)(b).
It stated that the award should be given binding effect by a court if a confirmation was
sought. The court stated that a proceeding to enforce could not be held in the bankruptcy court, but only in a district court where all appropriate defenses, including the
public policy defense, could be raised. See generally id.
170. N.Y. Convention, supra note 2, art. XIV.
171. See Quigley, supra note 32, at 1074.
172. 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Oh. 1981).
173. Id. at 952-53.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 953.
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the argument that India's courts have been shown to restrict the use of
the N.Y. Convention to the benefit of its nationals and to the prejudice
of others. Thus, the court found no reciprocity bar to enforcement, despite an expansive reading of the reciprocity provision.",
In Audi N.S.U. Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft v. Overseas Motors, Inc.,1 7 8 the district court summarily dismissed an argument based
on the reciprocity provision of the "nondomestic awards exclusion"
reservation. In this case an award was rendered in Switzerland and petitioner, a West German company, sought to confirm the award in the
United States. 79 The court concluded that although the Federal Republic of Germany opted for the "nondomestic awards exclusion" reservation, since the award was rendered in Switzerland, this reservation
was inapplicable. The award would be enforceable in petitioner's home
courts,' 80 and therefore, it should be enforceable in the United
States."'
IV.

CONCLUSION

In addition to the express defenses, several implied defenses have
been litigated, including nonretroactivity of the N.Y. Convention'8 2
and manifest disregard of the law by the arbitrators. 83 This review of
the cases, however, demonstrates that to achieve nonenforcement of a
foreign arbitral award is usually a herculean feat. This is true even
when the award is reduced to judgment in the rendering state.
The judiciary has been notably reluctant, in adjudicating the defenses, to find conditions warranting nonenforcement. Coupled with
the binding nature of the agreement to arbitrate, the overriding lesson
to be gleaned from this note is that planning before the international
contract is entered into is crucial. A thorough canvass of the advantages and disadvantages of forgoing judicial review of the merits of a
dispute should be undertaken with an eye toward ascertaining which
party will initiate third-party dispute resolution.
Philip R. West

177. Id.
178. 418 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
179. Id. at 983.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948
(S.D. Oh. 1981).
183. See supra note 44.

